Wonder

What do I draw from the process of taking this class?  I believe a greater appreciation for the diversity of perspectives concerning the religious experience.  It’s exciting to know that this dialogue is happening, and that I can participate in it through reading, thought, and writing (and probably other ways, too).

It was interesting to learn a little bit about Keirkegard, whom I had heard about when I was younger and had different thoughts and beliefs about the world.  He, too, was a shadowy figure for the people in my life.  I think he represented a radical departure from the norm.  I had the feeling he was highly critical of people who claimed they were “believers” but did not act accordingly.  They are “just going along,” or “doing the company line,” and so are in fact alientated from God, according to Keirkegard.

Feuerbach was very interesting – I can see how others like Durkheim and Marx took the principle of projection, which he seems to have established concerning religious faith and beliefs, and extended it to their particular fields of interest.   I think it is particularly interesting thinking about the phrase,  “the word became flesh” – demonstrating his idea concerning the “incarnation” or reification of supernatural properties.

His idea about being alienated, I believe, also is a first principle from which projection originates.  His belief that we have qualities about ourselves which we are separated from, and that this is voluntary, seems true to me.  I’m not on board with his ideas about humans having god-like properties, but that’s alright.  Also, his idea that the “real Christinity” was something else entirely seemed far-fetched.  Christianity – survives if “unconsciously held” – this is interesting, and I will have to think more on it.  Perhaps this indicates the degree to which Feuerbach believes we are deluding ourselves when we separate aspects of ourselves from our own identity, particularly when we only identify with the negative qualities.

I also think that the phrase, “the secret of religion is atheism,” or that “hidden in religion is atheism.”  Perhaps this is why Feuerbach believed that religion must be held loosely in our minds.  If religion is in fact studying our own minds (which I believe is true, to a certain degree), then it seems true his statement that theology is a type of anthropology (or psychology) – a “study of humans.”

I really liked the idea that once we have an idea _______ (fill in the blank – God, puppy, bobsled), we automatically assign it meaning or else it is simply a senseless sound or scribbles on a paper.  I do like the basic principle that whatever we fill in for this blank will reflect back on ourselves.

Hegel’s phenomenology of spirit concerning the master-slave relationship seems to kind of fit with Christianity’s insistence upon absolute obedience  – or else we should expect eternal torture – seems to fit in this category.  However, while I do believe that religion does arise from oppression, I would have to learn more about Hegel to understand him better.  From my understanding, his take seems limited.  Also, his idea about “God coming to know himself” seems to be far-fetched.

I also enjoyed the exercize concerning the “existence” of nothing.  This was fascinating, and while I had concluded before this that “nothing” was nothing if not impossible, it was actually very exciting to talk about it in class and to seem to come to some degree of concensus on the issue.  If there has always been something, then perhaps this does not disprove God, but I believe that if there’s something other than God to work with, then we’re on that track.

Angels and miracles -this was a fun exercise as well.  I’m glad we talked about this in class.  It is something that is overlooked all the time within religion: “So and so got better: what a miracle!”  “I got the job: what a miracle!  These types of statements rarely (if ever) make sense.

I do not think I agree with Phillips statement that faith claims are not “intellctual assents.”  I think that included within faith is an assent to its truth, whether we can physically or otherwise verfy its truth.

I agree with Philips to be careful, however,  I don’t know if it is possible to not have preconceived notions about religion.  Just like any other matter, it seems that we will have made up our mind before we know it oftentimes.  But keeping an eye open to this, and like he advises, to be careful – I think these are good ways of living in general, not just with regards to religion.

I like the idea that there is a thin line between what “works for me” and then what I believe is a rule for everyone.  The matter of moral truths not being metaphysical reality – for this part I’m not sure I’m on board.  There may not be ghostly substances floating around out there called moral truths, however, this does not seem to negate that certain actons are better to be done and others are harmful and should be prevented.  Maybe I’m not contradicting (I believe this was) Phillips, in fact.

Returning to the matter of “truth statements” concerning faith – I do think that the statement, “God exists” contains within it a statement that is believed to be actual Fact.  Actually, there is nothing more real or existent than God, from my understanding of some Christian traditions.   This statement is not just a fact, but it includes what I believe is intended as a factual statement.

It also makes sense that we cannot try and throw all believers and practicitioners of faith and religion into “one sack.”  It simply does not make sense.  There are billions of people on the Earth, and each one has a particular story, a particual psychology – so in effect, there are as many different religions people as there believers – or even on a larger way of looking at things, every single person  is a member of this larger church of individuals who live lifes of profound consequences (this may be taking things too far, but I still think the idea is interestin.

Finding where the individual theoriest went right and wrong is an interesting process.  There are so many angles on religion, and some no doubt have more of the picture than others.  However, how many ways can I describe a human being?  Our descriptions are of a process, than a static being.  However, I do believe that there are certain things about human beings that are true quite a bit of the time (this is common within the social sciences) – however if we can arrive at something which seems to hold true a lot of the time, this is actually quite the accomplishment.

I liked Prof. Pam’s question about if a person who has “lost” her faith has contradicted herself.  It points out the nature of belief, and that each one of us is dynamic and moving.  To reject what we believed yesterday in favor of new, more compelling evidence is not a contradiction, but very often learning.  Otherwise, we would never update our minds at all to take in new information.  Why should it be any different with religion?  God is an idea about which you believe has actual substance and relevence or not.  It is as simple as that, to me, when put this way.

I also liked her imagery with the “picture” which adjusts and shifts according to events in a person’s life.  In this case, we are always in the picture (I don’t think we mentioned this in class).  There is no way of escaping being in our assumed perecptions of the world.

So, the bottom line for me is to be open and try to learn as much as possible.  It is better to be ignorant and humble than wise and arrogant.  The humble person listens; the arrogant person talks.   I want to make sure that my talknig is consistent with my beleifs to respect other people and to be open to their views.  It doesn’t mean I will agree with them, but to listen with an open attitude seems important.  It’s a huge world (or a small world) depending on how much we are willing to let in and open up to in this incredible world.  This is what I’ve discovered about philosophy, is the possiblity, and actual encouragement to explore the world and angles and options – in this way, I have come to appreciate and love this ongoing process, this continual unfolding: it reflects the process of life itself, I believe.  Learning is amazing and can be fun and actually exciting, when thinking deeply – contemplating and reflecting – on aspects of our world and ourselves, as composing a part of this world.

Yes, I agree with Phillips in this regard, let us have an approach to life of wonder!

Phillips and Hume (3)

The third level of criticism by Hume is whether it makes sense to seek an answer to the question, “Why is there something rather than nothing?” Phillips quotes Philo who seeks to demolish the comparison of the building of a house to the creation of the universe – he states that we cannot observe such a thing or point to it. Phillips calls into question whether it even makes sense to speak of an absolute state of nothing at all. He says, “Remember that when it is said that there might have been nothing, this is supposed to be a state which could exist” (69). I agree with Phillips criticism that “we cannot refer to any process or development in answering the question” ‘who made the world’ because “if we want to give the cause of ‘everything’, what else is there to refer to?” (69).

Hume did think that it made sense to speak of ‘the world’ and to speculate what its origins might be” (69). I think that Phillips point about whether the word nothing in an absolute sense makes sense. This point undermines the cosmological argument – if it does not make sense to speak of nothing, then does it make sense to ask why there is something? We experience that there is in fact something, and we have never experienced anything different. Phillips further points out that to refer to the universe as a “thing” is confused, and that Hume makes this mistake. What could it even mean to have nothing exist at all? I agree that we are not discussing something – an object like a house – when we speak of the universe – and Phillips point that when we speak of ‘the world,’ this “must include, presumably, not only that which exists, but that which no longer exists, and that which is yet to exist” (71). These are very fascinating observations and thoughts concerning the concept of the universe and the concept of non-existence. I agree with Phillips – what would it mean to speak of nothing? What do we even mean when we speak of ‘the world’ or ‘the universe?’ ‘Nothing’ is something that seems to lack any referent ‘The world’ includes all of existence (without any referent to non-existence’) –for all time past, present, and future. We are swimming in the all-encompassing ocean of existence, and it seems that the concept of non-existence is not only beyond our experience, it is probably beyond our imagination. If at some point there was nothing, then I do not think we would be here to ponder its non-existence. These matters of ‘nothing’ and the timeless nature of the world – and the aspect of ‘the world’ not being an object or a thing all are extremely fascinating to me. I think we are coming to the very edges of the capacity for human understanding. This reinforces my assent to Philos’s statement that “nature must remain an incomprehensible mystery to us” – it is beyond my comprehension and I love to wonder at it all.

Phillips and Hume (2)

The second level of criticism is “whether nature can be seen as the product of design in the first place” (65). Phillips calls into question whether it makes sense to even think of the universe in terms of a garden. He quotes Huxley, who states, “Man has recreated Europe in his own image. Its tamed and temperate nature confirmed Wordsworth in his philosophisings” (66). Huxley also said that an adoration of nature like that of Wordsworth “is only possible for those who are prepared to falsify their immediate intuitions of Nature. For Nature, even in the temperate zone is always alien and unknown, and occasionally diabolic…A voyage through the tropics would have cured [Wordsworth] of his too easy and comfortable pantheism” (65). With a little more realistic view of the natural world, Wordsworth “would have learned once more to treat Nature naturally, as he treated it in his youth, to react to it spontaneously, loving where love was the appropriate emotion, fearing, hating, fighting whenever Nature presented itself to his intuition as being not merely strange, but hostile, inhumanely evil” (66).

Phillips states that “once the analogy between gardens and nature collapses, it opens the way to the recognition that nature admits of natural explanations, and that the inference to a designer has no basis in nature itself” (66). Norman Kemp Smith argues, “The existence of an artificial product is only possible in and through the existence of an external artificer: the natural, on the other hand, is qua natural, self-evolving and self-maintaining; that is to say, its form is as native to it as the matter of which it is composed. Indeed the argument is at its weakest precisely in those fields in which it professes to find its chief evidence…The hinge of a door affords conclusive proof of an artificer: the hinge of the bivalve shell, though incomparably superior as a hinge, affords no such proof, it is as natural in its origin as anything in physical Nature can be known to be” (66). Phillips concludes that “it is not true that particular causal explanations are intellectually inadequate, forcing us to ask further questions until we arrive at an explanation of the universe as such” (66). He seems to think it silly to proceed down too many questions of “Why?” when it comes to explanations of the universe.

It seems that Phillips agrees with Hume’s criticism, and takes it even a step further – he seems to call into question certain lines of questioning about the origins of the universe. Both of these criticisms are clearly very severe – I am not sure what this leaves the believer. If a believer thinks that God is the creator of all that exists, these criticisms seem to paint her beliefs as both misguided and wrongheaded to even ask the question to begin with. Even the non-believer is so constricted by Phillips’ assessment that she cannot even proceed down certain lines of questions too long without being intellectually condemned. I think that Phillips could have provided more evidence for this more severe criticism that he adds to the end of this section. Is it silly to ask what the origin of the universe is? Perhaps he is right – I have been inclined to think that at a certain point, the questions cease to allow for verifiable answers, so perhaps it makes the most sense to be in wonder at this juncture and not seek answers, as if the world were a fill in the blank or multiple choice test, allowing for a simple resolution to ultimate questions of origin. I think that our minds naturally do not like “loose ends,” and to have to have this huge open-ended question is very uncomfortable for us as human beings. We like structure and boundaries within to operate – answers to our questions like where the universe came from, what it means to be human, what our purpose of living is, how life happens, and what happens to us when we die. We want an ultimate origin to what is right or wrong, so that there is not an “infinite regress” of moral authorities and reasoning. We seek permanence in a continually changing world. We must override our natural desire for security, structure, and answers in order to simply wonder at the unfathomable.

Phillips and Hume (1)

There are three principle levels of criticism by Hume that Phillips addresses. The first “is Philo’s claim that we cannot infer more about God than the evidence allows” (Phillips 57). Philo “claims that God’s nature must remain an incomprehensible mystery to us” because “we have no experience of divine attributes and operations” (58). Cleanthes believes that the evidence of the universe points conclusively to a deity. Phillips states that “[w]e may say that there is some reason, in some circumstances, to react in either way” (58). He says that if the best we can arrive at through evidence is a “mixed bag,” then we do not have grounds to believe “in an all-powerful, all-knowing, all-loving God. We cannot arrive at such a belief on an experiential or experimental basis. Phillips gives the example of the secret gardener to illustrate his point.

Tennessen objects to what he sees as the attempts of believers to judge God with a double standard. Either we judge God by the usual standards, in which case he would be found guilty, or “beyond these moral standards, the consequence being that we find him in the place reserved for monsters” (60). He points to the God depicted in the book of Job in the Bible, and describes how Job found God to be “a ruler of grotesque primitivity, a cosmic cave dweller, a braggart and a rumble-dumble, almost congenial in his complete ignorance about spiritual refinement…The new thing for Job is not God’s quantitative greatness; he had realized this in advance…his discovery lies in God’s qualitative smallness” (61). Tennessen believes this is the god of the Old Testament and represents “the blind forces of nature, completely indifferent to the human need for order and meaning and justice…the unpredictable visitations by disease and death, the transitoriness of fame, the treason by friends and kin. He is the god of machines and power, of despotism and conquest, of pieces of brass and armoured plates” (61). Phillips states that there are other interpretations that a believer may have of God which does not paint this being as a “god of caprice” (62).

Phillips describes one possible interpretation of Christianity that describes the creation of the world in terms of abidication, and God’s only power “is that of love” (63). He describes how Zeus “became intimate with man, by sharing in his suffering” (63). Phillips argues that “the primary use of language of religion is not factual, idiomatic or metaphorical” (64). He says that “although there are metaphors in religious language, its primary use is to offer us a way of thinking about our relation to the world. It is as though religion says to one, ‘Think like this’. Phillips says that we do not “have to infer the character of nature’s Author from mixed evidence. Rather, in ancient and Christian religion, we are offered a way of thinking about the mixed character of our lives. Thus, in contemplating this way of thinking, we are not involved…in a vain attempt to avoid Hume’s criticisms” (65).

I’m not sure that this response satisfies me. It seems like a slight of hand and trickery to say that God is just powerful “in love.” This is not a truly all-powerful, all-knowing God if he is limited to just abdication, love, and sacrifice. This God shows lack of foresight and lack of ability to effectively prevent harm for the people he loves – eternal punishment in hell is no minor thing. Even with the sacrifice of Jesus, this does not resolve the issue, since each person must accept it or else they are damned forever. This does not seem very loving. So, this “way of thinking about the mixed character of our lives” may be a pleasant contemplation for the believer, since he believes his salvation is secure, but what of the many who have everlasting suffering to which to look forward? Besides, this sort of maneuver seems to miss what the origin of this supposed revelation is – second-hand supposed “inspired” writings? There are obviously many subtleties within religion, but I believe that Hume’s criticism stands: we should not infer more than the evidence allows. I agree with Philo that “God’s nature must remain an incomprehensible mystery to us.” I would probably not use the term God, but something like “the great mysteries of life.”

Phillips and Wittgensteinian Fideism

The first view of Wittgensteinian Fideism is “that religious beliefs are logically cut off from all other aspects of human life” (26). Phillips argues that prayer, for instance gains its meaning from other aspects of life – a person prays about other events that have happened in one’s life. With nothing else to reference, prayer has no meaning. He argues that the hermeneutics of recollection and suspicion “often…do divorce religious beliefs from the human phenomena that lie behind them” (27).

“The second thesis Wittgensteinian Fideists are supposed to hold is that religious belief can only be understood by religious believers” (27). Phillips argues that it is possible to compare beliefs and thought patterns with each other. He states that “a person …may see the kind of thing atheism is and still reject it” – and he says the same thing about religious belief (27). I’m not sure that I agree with him on this point. Understanding conceptually seems to differ from understanding experientially. Do I truly understand what it means to live in Japan if I study the matter but never live there? He states that those who argue that “rational evidence” should be used to assess beliefs are begging the question about what is rational. Here we have a problem, because naturally, each group will assume that their means of measurement will be correct – including the “objective” philosopher.

“The third view which Wittgensteinian Fideism us supposed to hold is that religious language determines what is and is not meaningful in religion” (28) Phillips argues that religious people can be conceptually confused, just like anyone else. For instance, a person who believes that if she went into space that she would see God, for Phillips, this person is confused. He also refers to “superstition” as distinct from religion. This does not seem to directly answer the question, however, because being conceptually confused differs from prioritization of ideas.

“The fourth thesis Wittgensteinian Fideists are supposed to hold is that religious beliefs cannot be criticised” (29). He responds by stating that there are criticisms based on conceptual confusions and what he refers to as “superstition,” as just mentioned, and also criticism from “anti-religious moral perspectives…[and] interreligious criticisms. Some will be called ‘false’, ‘higher’ or lower. But these are personal judgments” (29).

“The fifth view attributed to Wittgensteinian Fideism is that religious beliefs cannot be affected by personal, social or cultural events” (29). Phillips responds that “believing is not an isolated activity” – believers are affected by cultural changes just like everyone else. Phillips states that he has “criticised various attempts to make religion logically immune from such threats” (30). He does not accept that “the heart is a secret place where a relationship with God is immune to all that surrounds it” – he states that if the person looses this sense of the concept heart in its spiritual sense, that this approach falls apart. For those who believe that faith can be held to like a set of rational proofs, he states his thought that it is “not the proofs that ground faith, but faith which breathes into the proofs whatever life they had” (30). He also rejects what he believes to be either a priori pessimism or optimism concerning the ability of religious beliefs to accommodate cultural changes. He clearly states that “personal, social or cultural events can affect religious belief” (30). Phillips states that “[i]n presenting examples of irreducibly religious meanings,” we have “an invitation to consider these examples, without prejudice, and to consider whether naturalistic explanations do justice to them” (30). He wants to “give this kind of attention, in religious studies” – what seems to me to be a perspective of intellectual curiosity, not misplaced judgment.

Phillips and Harvey

Phillips engages with Harvey in his objections to the feasibility of the hermeneutics of contemplation. He discusses questions concerning “conceptual frameworks or grids” (Phillips 19).

“First, Harvey asks whether it makes sense to talk of choosing or adopting conceptual frameworks or grids” (19). Phillips seems to think that this is a confused idea – that we do not accept an entire framework the same way that we do not abruptly adopt an entire language ex nihilo. He points to the example of a “social contract” – it is supposed to enable agreement between citizens, however it presupposes this agreement in order to make possible the contract.

The second question that Harvey poses is “whether a person can use two conceptual frameworks at the same time” (20). Do scientific and religious concepts contradict each other? Phillips responds that this will be particular to the individual – some see a conflict where others do not. He also points out that the culture in which a person lives in large part can determine the lens through which she views religious claims – for instance a miracle. If a miracle is viewed through the lens of scientific, natural enquiry, then the miracle itself is likely to be ruled out.

“Harvey’s third question is whether, if religion is regarded as a conceptual framework, it can be regarded as true or false” (22). Philips counters that it “is judgments which are made under concepts which are true or false” – that it does not make sense to speak of entire conceptual frameworks as true or false (22).

The fourth question is, in the light of multiple conceptual frameworks, “how any framework or grid can be regarded as absolute” (22). Phillips argues that this does not imply absolute in the universal sense. We each have varying degrees of certainty about our conceptual frameworks.

The fifth question is “whether the adoption of a framework or grid is a matter of faith, and whether a clash of frameworks or grids is akin to those aesthetic disagreements which are notoriously difficult to resolve” (22). Phillips reminds us of the problem of phrasing the question, “decisions to adopt” (22). However, he does say that “clashes in perspectival views of the world involving religion…have, in fact, far more in common with moral or aesthetic perspectival clashes than disputes between competing theories or hypotheses” (23).

Wittgenstein and James

Wittgenstein, who was very influential on Phillips, made it a point to represent religion faithfully. He wanted to “reflect” back like a mirror religious concepts. He wanted to leave “everything as it is” and not “interfere with the actual use of language” (Phillips 237). So, for him, the duty of the philosopher was of accurate description of religious beliefs. He did not assume that religion “is an outmoded way of thinking,” and so did not seek to judge or reform it through a scientific or rationalistic approach (240)

Wittgenstein sought to make a distinction between religion and superstition. He believed that superstition originates from “fear and is a sort of false science” (245). For instance, the belief that a certain behavior labeled as sin would result in “worldly punishment” or praying to God to avoid bad consequences was misguided. Religion was based on trust, not fear, for Wittgenstein. He sometimes differentiated between “higher” and “lower” religious expressions. Those who are living on the higher level of religious experience will have access to meanings which those on lower levels will not have. For instance, Wittgenstein interpreted “the Pauline doctrine of predestination [as] ugly nonsense, irreligiousness,” whereas someone at a higher level of religious experience would presumably be able to appreciate its deeper religious significance (246). In some instances, he “simply disbelieves” religious accounts as mistaken, such as trees bowing to a believer (248).

For James, he was not as interested in making philosophical delineations between what was reasonable and not reasonable. Neither was he interested in religious beliefs that were only accessible to religious people who have particular religious interpretations. He was interested in fantastic accounts of religious ecstasy – for him, this is what is truly religious. Whether hallucinations of not, this was not of interest to James – transformative experiences were of utmost importance in his religious investigations. As with the distinction made between James and Phillips, Wittgenstein parts ways with James because he is primarily interested in the ideas and concepts of religion, and in fact sometimes casts a critical eye on fantastic accounts by believers.

Phillips and James

Phillips, as a philosopher, was interested in faithfully representing religious beliefs and practices. He described three different approaches to religion – the hermeneutics of suspicion, recollection, and reflection. For Phillips, the hermeneutics of suspicion is any approach that does not accept that a religious belief is simply that – religious. Those who follow this approach must “explain away” beliefs through reductionist methods: someone like Freud or Durkheim seek some other explanation to religion, and then “translate” religion through this lens. The hermeneutics of recollection is an approach which is primarily apologetic for a given religion. A person of a given religion or faith who seeks to defend their beliefs from the standpoint of their own doctrines is practicing the hermeneutics of recollection.

Phillips seeks to set out a third approach which does not distort or defend religion, but faithfully give an account for it, which is the hermeneutics of contemplation. This approach gives attention to the role that religious “concepts play in human life” (Phillips 4). He believed that the non-religious philosopher who had an interest in religion could make efforts to understand religious concepts and seek to “explain religion in non-religious terms” (Phillips 5). This approach is neither seeking to explain away religion or defend it, it is simply seeking to understand and consider the role certain concepts play in people’s lives.

For James, though he shared Phillips’ non-reductionist approach, he was not interested so much with particular beliefs, but with experiences of individuals, as noted in the comparison with Evans-Pritchard. The particulars of each theology were not of concern to James, since these particular beliefs for him did not substantiate true religious experience. Since James was a psychologist, he wanted to know what could be called a religious experience in the mind? Particular patterns of thought concerning beliefs were not as significant as, say, a mystical experience of union with a divine existence. These kinds of experiences on which James focused where accompanied by great joy and transformation to the individual’s life. He was not interested in translating religious concepts to philosophical ones, necessarily.

Evans-Pritchard and James

Evans-Pritchard believed that the sociological approach was critical to understanding religion, however he did not believe that it was prudent to make sweeping generalizations concerning theories of religion. He took each particular culture as an entity in itself to be studied. In this respect, he diverged from Durkheim, who he greatly admired.

Evans-Pritchard studied a group of people called the Azande, which lived in the Sudan region of East Africa. He later studied a group of people called Nuer, who lived to the north of the Azande. In both of these tribes, he immersed himself in the lives of these people and discovered their beliefs and religious practices. He labored to become knowledgeable of the specific theologies of these tribes. He was not looking to explain away their beliefs, but wanted to understand the specific beliefs within the context of the particular tribes. He looked for a “comprehensive” sociological approach, but limited to the scope of a particular group of people (Pals 252). He cautioned that theorists who pretend to understand religious beliefs without studying those beliefs from the inside of the group that practices those beliefs are misguided. He cautioned against universal claims concerning religion, but urged study of all kinds of religions.

James, on the other hand, gave his attention almost exclusively to the individual religious experiences of individuals, and purposefully did not give attention to beliefs and theology. And so, despite their shared approach to religion that did not seek to make it into anything other than what it is – religion – they diverged greatly in this respect. As in the comparison with Durkheim, James’ interest in the psychological states of individual people is indicative of his being a psychologist and philosopher. He was not interested in social processes or studying particular groups or tribes, because he did not share Evans-Pritchards sociological/anthropological approach.

Marx and James

Marx also believed that religion was a force of the group, however he viewed it through the lens of class struggle and inequalities. He did not view religion as a necessary and natural part of society, as Durkheim did, but rather as a poisonous subjugating force. He was materialist in his approach to the world, which meant that he believed that any talk of the afterlife or supernatural forces were complete nonsense. There existed nothing beyond the material world, for Marx. He believed that human beings have always “been motivated not by grand ideas but by very basic material concerns…[such as] food, clothing, and shelter” (Pals 123).

Marx believed because of the privatization of property, people gradually get cut off from their own labor. Private ownership leads to a disconnect between people – they only way they can deal with each other is through exchanging property which they own. Those who own land or factories naturally end up with disproportionate amounts of power, so the laborer is alienated from his own work and from his fellow human beings. Society is permeated with unjust inequalities, and so even those philosophers, writers, or artists who claim “individualism and originality… depend on the accepted ideas of the age for their success, so even when they seem to protest, they in reality give unwitting, silent approval to society under the oppressors’ control” (Pals 131).

Religion, for Marx, is a deliberate attempt to delude the people into thinking that the unjust conditions in which they live is acceptable. Religion takes our own moral properties and attributes them “to an imaginary and alien being” called God (Pals 134). Religious beliefs and practices are not only exercises in delusion, they are “fundamentally destructive,” because they deprive people of the opportunity to improve their situations or struggle against the fundamentally unjust structures of society.

James did not share Marx’s view concerning class inequalities and religion being a force of evil in the world. As noted in the comparison with Durkheim, James was very interested in the accounts of individual people concerning religious experiences. Marx would no doubt consider this approach completely off-base and small-minded. Marx could care less about a person’s supposed encounter with God – these were signs not of a religious experience, but of yet another deluded person who was ignoring their own social oppression.